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A Review of Lehr v. Robertson
Allison Puckett

Case Background
In 1976, Jessica M. was born out of wedlock to Lorainne
Robertson, an appellee, and Jonathan Lehr, the appellant.
Lorraine Robertson remarried Richard Robertson eight
months following Jessica's birth. After Jessica's second
birthday, Lorraine Robertson and her husband jointly filed an
adoption petition in the Ulster County New York Family
Court. The court issued an adoption order and Jessica legally
belonged to the couple.
Jonathan Lehr never offered any support on behalf his
daughter Jessica. He formed no relationship with her
financially or personally, and did not intend to marry her
mother. Because Lehr failed to form a relationship with his
daughter and neglected to enter his name in the Putative
Father Registry kept by the state of New York, Lehr forfeited
his right to be notified of any adoption proceedings
concerning his biological daughter. A New York statue
required notification of any filed adoption petition to the
putative father in five instances.
Those who have been adjudicated to be the
father, those who have been identified as the
father on the child's birth certificate, those who
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live openly with the child and the child's
mother and who hold themselves out to be the
father, those who have been identified as the
father by the mother in a sworn written
statement, and those who were married to the
child's mother before the child was six months
old (Lehr).
Jonathan Lehr freely admitted he did not fit into any of
the above listed classifications, although Lorraine Robertson
never denied Lehr fathered Jessica. The court considered Lehr
a citizen fully capable of maintaining and protecting his own
rights, therefore, they assumed he had the ability to mail in
the card to the putative father registry which would have
guaranteed him rights to his daughter.
After the Robertsons began the adoption
proceedings, Lehr, without knowledge of the filed
petition, filed his own "visitation and paternity petition"
the family court of Westchester County, New York. The
petition included reasonable visitation rights,
determination of paternity, and an order of support.
Lehr commenced action on January 30, 1979. The
Robertsons were notified of Lehr's petition on February
22, 1979. The Robertsons' attorney informed the Ulster
County Court about the petition filed by the father of
Jessica, and the Ulster Court judge ordered a stay on the
paternity proceedings until the proceedings moved to
Ulster County.
An Ulster County judge signed the Robertsons'
adoption order on March 7, 1979. Just hours after
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signing, Lehr's attorney called the judge and inform~d
him of his client's intent to seek a stay on the adoptiOn
proceedings. The judge then told Lehr's ~ttorn~y he
already signed the adoption order and beheved 1t
unnecessary to "give notice to appellant prior to the entry
of the order of adoption" (Lehr).
Lehr decided to contest the adoption order through
attempts to nullify the adoption. He filed a petition
claiming a violation of his rights under "the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment," as basis for this nullification.

The Decisions, Arguments, and
Opinions of the Lower and Upper Courts
The lowest court, Ulster County New York Family
Court, denied Lehr's petition. Upon appeal to the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court, the
lower court's ruling was affirmed and the case passed to
the New York Court of Appeals where the decision was
upheld. The state courts addressed several important .
issues in the case and provided a sound argument provmg
the appellant's constitutional rights had not been
violated.
The New York State Court combated Lehr's claim
to denial of his rights according to the Due Process
Clause "Whereas an unwed father demonstrated a full
'
commitment
to the responsibilities of parenthood by
'coming forward to participate in the rearing of his child,'
(Caban v. Mohammed) his interest in personal contact
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with his child acquired substantial protection under the
Due Process Clause" (Lehr). In addition, the state courts
found a biological link does not serve to provide the
father equal protection under the Due Process Clause.
Furthermore, if a father neglected to develop a
relationship with his child, the Constitution does not
require state consideration of the biological father's
opinions in regards to the child's best interest.
The court held the appellant fully capable of gaining
protection under the Due Process Clause by filling out
the postcard and mailing it to the Putative Father
Registry which would have registered Lehr as Jessica's
father, and thus given him the right to notification of her
adoption.
Another "right violation" the New York State Court
addressed was the Equal Protection Clause. Due to the
distinct, almost opposite relationships Robertson and
Lehr maintained with Jessica, the court decided the Equal
Protection Clause did not prohibit granting different legal
rights to the two parents. While Lehr cultivated little or
no relationship with his daughter, Robertson developed
an almost exclusive custodial and financial relationship
with Jessica. Had Lehr originally attempted to create a
relationship with his daughter, the court most likely
would have heard his plea.
After an extensive review of the case, the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld the decision made by
the New York Court of Appeals. When considering the
decision, the Supreme Court Justices ruled Lehr's rights

had not been violated after scrutinizing evaluation of the
case in reference to all aspects of the law. The Court
noted decisions involving adoption and child custody
were based on a variety of state statues. One point of
examination, Lehr' s Due Process claim, the Justices based
the decision largely upon three previously decided court
cases; Stanley v Illinois, Quilloin v Walcott, and Caban v
Mohammed. Although these held some similarities to
Lehr's case, the Supreme Court could not justify
overturning the State's decision. Upon examination of
these cases, the Court recalled several times "parental
rights did not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child," (Caban) and "the
mere existence of a biological link does not merit
equivalent constitutional protection" (Lehr). The
Supreme Court stated it was "concerned only with
whether New York has adequately shown his
opportunity to form such a relationship" (Lehr).
Ultimately, the Court decided ample protection of Lehr's
rights was accomplished.
Although the appellant, Lehr, argued the rulings of
Stanley v. Illinois and Caban v. Mohammed entitled him to
the right of notification about adoption proceedings, in
addition to court consideration of his opinions
concerning the child's best interests, the Supreme Court
upheld the State Court's decision. The Court held Lehr
had the opportunity to receive notice of this daughter's
adoption by filing his name with the Putative Father
Registry, and noted that Lehr had forfeited this right by
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not returning the card. Therefore, Lehr's claim that his
daughter's adoption was null and void was deemed invalid
because through Lehr's own actions and choices he lost
the right to advance notice.
Along with the examination of the Putative Father
Registry issue, the Court also decided Lehr did not fit
into any of the other classes of possible fathers listed
under New York Law. For this reason he was not
guaranteed notice of the adoption petition as the other
classes of fathers would have been. The Court made a
special note that Lehr freely admitted he did not belong
to any of the other classes.
The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of
the New York State Courts concerning the correctness of
the Family Court in entering the adoption order with
knowledge of the filed paternity petition, even though
the father was unaware of the adoption proceedings. The
Court decided that moving ahead with the adoption
petition was within the Family Court's discretion. When
reviewing the state's decision in reference to Caban v.
Mohammed, the Court found the case was not retroactive;
and since the case had been decided after the State's
ruling, the decision was not applicable to Lehr's case.
Regarding Lehr's other claim concerning the
violation of equal protection, guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, the Court concluded the "existence
or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between
parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both
the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child"
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(Lehr). Upon comparing Lehr's case to Caban v.
Mohammed, the relationships between the parents and
child are very different. Both parents in Caban had wellestablished relationships with the child, whereas Lehr,
never had any substantial relationship with the child.
Since Lorraine Robertson held a significant relationship
with her child, and Jonathan Lehr did not, the Court
decided the two parents should be granted different legal
rights in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
The Fairness and Justice of the Judgment
Overall, the judgment served justice fairly.
However, a review and study of the case provided noteworthy points. For example, according to Lehr, he
helped pay for the birth of Jessica and offered the mother
financial assistance. Later, Robertson and the baby
disappeared and Lehr instigated a search. For several
months the search proved fruitless. By the time Lehr
located Jessica and filed his paternity petition~ t~e .
adoption proceedings had already begun. Th1s md1cated
he actually did attempt to establish a personal and
financial relationship with his daughter. Lehr's attempts
were major factors in the dissenting justices' opinions.
Another argument, which came to the forefront, was
the weakness of the biological link. Repeatedly noted
was that the biological link was not enough to warrant a
parental relationship or equal protecti.on ri~hts ~ithout
development of the parent/ child relauonsh1p. R1chard

40

not returning the card. Therefore, Lehr's claim that his
daughter's adoption was null and void was deemed invalid
because through Lehr's own actions and choices he lost
the right to advance notice.
Along with the examination of the Putative Father
Registry issue, the Court also decided Lehr did not fit
into any of the other classes of possible fathers listed
under New York Law. For this reason he was not
guaranteed notice of the adoption petition as the other
classes of fathers would have been. The Court made a
special note that Lehr freely admitted he did not belong
to any of the other classes.
The Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of
the New York State Courts concerning the correctness of
the Family Court in entering the adoption order with
knowledge of the filed paternity petition, even though
the father was unaware of the adoption proceedings. The
Court decided that moving ahead with the adoption
petition was within the Family Court's discretion. When
reviewing the state's decision in reference to Caban v.
Mohammed, the Court found the case was not retroactive;
and since the case had been decided after the State's
ruling, the decision was not applicable to Lehr's case.
Regarding Lehr's other claim concerning the
violation of equal protection, guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, the Court concluded the "existence
or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between
parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both
the rights of the parent and the best interests of the child"

41

(Lehr). Upon comparing Lehr's case to Caban v.
Mohammed, the relationships between the parents and
child are very different. Both parents in Caban had wellestablished relationships with the child, whereas Lehr,
never had any substantial relationship with the child.
Since Lorraine Robertson held a significant relationship
with her child, and Jonathan Lehr did not, the Court
decided the two parents should be granted different legal
rights in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Constitution.
The Fairness and Justice of the Judgment
Overall, the judgment served justice fairly.
However, a review and study of the case provided noteworthy points. For example, according to Lehr, he
helped pay for the birth of Jessica and offered the mother
financial assistance. Later, Robertson and the baby
disappeared and Lehr instigated a search. For several
months the search proved fruitless. By the time Lehr
located Jessica and filed his paternity petition~ t~e .
adoption proceedings had already begun. This mdicated
he actually did attempt to establish a personal and
financial relationship with his daughter. Lehr's attempts
were major factors in the dissenting justices' opinions.
Another argument, which came to the forefront, was
the weakness of the biological link. Repeatedly noted
was that the biological link was not enough to warrant a
parental relationship or equal protecti.on ri~hts ~ithout
development of the parent/ child relationship. Richard

42

Hoffman stated his opinion in an article in the
Connecticut Law Review, "Lehr v. Robertson is a warning
to unwed fathers that despite Stanley and Caban, the
conclusive presumption against them is still lurking in the
background of constitutional law. The biological fatherchild connection will not overcome the presumption. As
far as the courts were concerned, Jonathan Lehr might as
well have been dead" (Hoffman 607).
In the Harvard Women's Law Journal, Jennifer Raab
examined an interesting aspect: "it is also quite possible
that concerned unwed fathers such as Lehr are becoming
more common ... to enable these fathers to channel
productively this concern, traditional assumptions about
parenting roles and an unfounded preference for the
nuclear family must be abandoned" (Raab 285). She
concluded, "providing unwed fathers notice and an
opportunity to be heard would enhance the
determination of the child's best interests and represent a
step towards a society in which the equal parenting
responsibilities of both sexes are legally recognized"
(Raab 286). The idea had significant merit, especially
since it reflected the changing attitudes and social 'norms'
in today's society.
However, after consideration of all these points, the
case still boiled down to the fact that Jonathan Lehr had
the right to notification of the adoption, if he had mailed
in the card to the Putative Father Registry. Lehr's rights
were not violated. Indeed, Lehr's rights were "protected"
by allowing him the opportunity he failed to grasp. Jane
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Perry noted, "The Supreme Court in Lehr also upheld
the family judge's determination that strict compliance
with the New York statute was necessary" (1541). If the
State's decision had not been affirmed then it would have
set a dangerous precedent making the Putative Father
Registry voluntary. Had the Supreme Court decided
Lehr should have been made aware of the adoption
proceedings, it would have nullified the statute that
requires registry. In essence, to notify would have been
to nullify a law. Considering the appellant's ability and
opportunity to avert the adoption proceedings through
notification, the Supreme Court decided fairly and served
justice by affirming the New York Court of Appeals'
decision.
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Due Process, Equal Protection,
and the Unwed Father
Richard J. Matson

Introduction
Many cases have been tried by the United States
Supreme Court wherein the defendants believed that their
rights to due process and equal protection had been violated in
the original trial. These rights were established in Section I of
the Fourteenth Amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction equal protection of the laws (emphasis
added).
The due process clause guarantees the right to a fair trial and
protects each citizen's basic rights1• According to the
Supreme Court, this includes the right of a parent to carry on
a relationship with their child (Quilloin 255). The equal
protection clause prohibits discrimination between persons
similarly situated under given conditions, usually based on
race or sex (Conley 367). But what is meant by "persons
'Bill of Rights, United States Constitution.

